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STUDENT PRACTICE-LIMITED APPEARANCES IN
COURT BY THIRD YEAR LAW STUDENTS
The practice of law as it is known to our legal system has been a
closely guarded institution since its development in England during the
Middle Ages. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the legal pro-
fession became organized and obtained the monopoly of legal work it
still enjoys today.1 Even before the end of the thirteenth century, it
was generally recognized that although a litigant could personally appear
and argue in his own behalf, the party represented by a lawyer, who was
an expert in the law and its language, would have a decided advantage
over his opponent.2
The practice of law is no less jealously guarded today than it was
in early England. By statutory mandate one must be licensed to prac-
tice law,' and the states have been granted broad power to regulate the
practice of law within their borders.' It is a misdemeanor in Virginia
to practice law without a license.5 The avowed purpose in such regu-
lation is not to make a professional monopoly but to assure the public
that the members of the bar possess the necessary moral and educational
requirements6 In furtherance of these aims, the Virginia Supreme Court
'See generally 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 484 (3d ed. 1924)
[hereinafter cited as 2 W. HoLDswoRmH.
The beginning of the modern bar association may probably be marked when
Cardinal Otho in 1237 required that no one could serve as an advocate in an ecclesiastical
court until he had taken the oath before a bishop to do his duty and not to pervert
justice. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 215 (2d ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAN].
In 1292 the King directed the judges to provide a certain number of attorneys and
apprentices to follow the court who should have the exclusive right of practicing before
it. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra at 314.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 211.
3 VA. CODE ANN. § 54-42 (1967). See Home v. Bridwell, 193 Va. 381, 68 S.E.2d 535
(1952).
4 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6
(1964) (but in doing so, the state cannot ignore the rights of individuals secured by the
Constitution).
5 VA. CODE ANN. § 54-44 (1967).
6 Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937);
\West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
Even before one is granted a license it must be shown that he is a person of high
moral character. Campbell v. Third Dist. Comm., 179 Va. 244, 18 S.E.2d 883 (1942).
The right of a state to require high quality standards for the practice of law or to
revoke or suspend the licenses of those guilty of unethical conduct is unquestioned.
NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958).
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has adopted the Rules for the Integration of the State Bar7 defining the
practice of law and prescribing codes of ethics and disciplinary pro-
cedure.
I. THE PRACTICE OF LAw
In order to ascertain what constitutes the unauthorized practice of
law, it must first be determined what activities comprise the practice of
law. The definition adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court in the Rules
for the Integration of the State Bar is very broad:
. . . [I]t is from the relation of attorney and client that any definition
of the practice of law must be derived.
Generally, the relation of attorney and client exists, and one is
deemed to be practicing law, whenever he furnishes to another advice
or service under circumstances which imply his possession and use
of legal knowledge or skill.
Specifically, the relation of attorney and client exists, and one is
deemed to be practicing law, whenever-
(1) One undertakes for compensation, direct or indirect, to advise
another, not his regular employer, in any matter involving the appli-
cation of legal principles to facts or purposes or desires.
(2) One, other than as a regular employee acting for his employer,
undertakes, with or without compensation, to prepare for another
legal instruments of any character, other than notices or contracts
incident to the regular course of conducting a licensed business.
(3) One undertakes, with or without compensation, to represent the
interest of another before any tribunal,-judicial, administrative, or
executive,-othervise than in the presentation of facts, figures, or fac-
tual conclusions, as distinguished from legal conclusions, by an em-
ployee regularly and bona fide employed on a salary basis, or by one
specially employed as an expert in respect to such facts and figures
when such presentation by such employee or expert does not involve
the examination of witnesses or preparation of pleadings."
Prior to the adoption of the Rules for the Integration of the State
Bar in 1938, "no official attempt had been made to formulate an all-
7 VA. Sup. CT. R. 6, INTEGRA-oN OF Tim STATE BARt is authorized by VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54-48 (1967). See Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, Inc., 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720
(1947).
8 VA. Sup. Cr. R. 6, INTEGRATIoN OF THE STATE BAR I. See 171 Va. at xvii.
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inclusive definition of the practice of law." 9 The court in 1942, how-
ever, quoted with approval a statement that the phrase "practicing law"
or "the practice of law" has had such a definite meaning throughout the
country that no further definition is necessary.' Notwithstanding such
statements, what constitutes "the practice of law" and the "unauthorized
practice of law" is subject to broad interpretation.
The definition given to the practice of law in Louisiana is quite broad,
encompassing various activities of one who holds himself out to the
public as being learned in the law including preparation of pleadings
and legal instruments, conveyancing, all advice to clients, the drafting
of wills and negotiation." West Virginia has adopted a similar descrip-
tion of the type of activity in which a licensed attorney may engage.'2
It has been said that the character of the act determines whether one is
practicing law, and it is immaterial whether such act is carried on in
an office, before a court or before an administrative body.' 3 In contrast
to most interpretations, Massachusetts considers the traditional profes-
sional activities such as the preparation of pleadings and the management
and trial of an action on behalf of clients before a tribunal to be the
practice of law, but the gratuitous furnishing of legal aid to the poor
is not the practice of law.14 It has been consistently held that natural
persons who appear in their own behalf do not engage in the unauthor-
ized practice of law. 5
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
9 Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, 186 Va. 30, 33, 41 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1947).
10 Campbell v. Third Dist. Comm., 179 Va. 244, 250, 18 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1942).
11 Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. 1936).
12West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
13 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 II. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937). See
Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 19 P.2d 942 (1933) (dicta) (a law clerk who only
does preparatory work such as research, from which an attorney would carry the
matter to its conclusion, would not be considered involved in unathorized practice).
14 1n re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935).
15 Id.; West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
The right of a party to appear in his own behalf and be heard in the courts
is fundamental. It is an inalienable right common to all, guaranteed both by the
Constitution of the State and the Constitution of the United States. The right
to have some one else appear and speak for one, or the right of such other to
appear in the courts as a representative of a litigant is not an inalienable right.
To represent another in the courts is not a right but a privilege, to be granted
and regulated by law for the protection of the public.
Bryce v. Gillespie, 160 Va. 137, 144, 168 S.E. 653, 655 (1933).
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to criminal defendants ". . . the assistance of counsel for his defense,"
and the courts have granted a right to counsel at nearly every stage of a
criminal proceeding." Recently such a right to counsel has been re-
quired not only for felonies but also for certain misdemeanors,'17 thus
emphasizing the underlying rationale that:
The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is
to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignor-
ance of his legal and constitutional rights. .... 18
The situation becomes more acute when an indigent defendant is in-
volved, for as stated in Gideon v. Wainwright,'9
: , . [I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him.20
Certain constitutional limitations have been placed upon the counsel
provided in criminal prosecutions. Although the indigent must be fur-
nished counsel at public expense, the standard is the same but not su-
perior to that afforded fee-paying clients.2 ' The standard in both situ-
16See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (in investigation of a suspect);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (at custody); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (at lineup); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (at preliminary hear-
ing); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (at arraignment); Hawk v. Olson,
326 U.S. 271 (1945) (preparation for trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)
(preparation for, trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (during trial);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (during trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
352 (1963) (for first appeal).
The right to assistance of counsel is extended to state prosecutions through the
fourteenth amendment. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 686, 173 S.E.2d 794
(1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970), commented
on in 5 U. RicH. L. REv. 442 (1971).
17 Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Va. 1971).
18 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,465 (1938).
[I]t is all too easy for the bench and the bar to dismiss certain cases as simple
ones; we fail to perceive the judicial process as do laymen with less or different
education. "That which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the lawyer-to the
untrained layman-may appear intricate, complex, and mysterious."
Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 695 (ED. Va. 1971). See also Brotherhood of
R:R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
19 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20 Id. at 344.
21 United States ex rel. McCoy v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1969).
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ations, then, is for "effective" assistance of counsel;' that is, assistance
not necessarily successful but sufficiently competent to prevent the trial
from becoming a "farce" or a "mockery" of justice.as
The competence and experience of counsel representing a criminal
defendant may have to be commensurate with the seriousness of the
charge. An imposter posing as a qualified member of the bar was held
not to meet the sixth amendment demands in a homocide prosecution. 4
Where a defendant was indicted for a capital crime but arraigned on a
non-capital felony, his appointed counsel, who had been dropped from
the roll of the bar for non-payment of dues, was held to be incompe-
tent and the defendant denied due process of law.as However, where
appointed counsel was merely a young member of the bar, lacking ex-
perience and background in trial work, due process was held not to
have been denied.26
Where two law students, not licensed to practice law, were appointed
to represent an indigent defendant and the right to counsel had not been
waived, the sixth amendment requirement of assistance of counsel was
held not to have been met.2 7 However, where a former justice of the
peace, learned in the law, represented a manslaughter defendant, the
constitutional requirement was met although counsel was not a member
of the bar. 8
The plight of the poor and of those in penal institutions necessarily
demands a relaxation of strict constitutional limitations on the qualifica-
22 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23See, e.g., United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1969);
United States v. Dilella, 354 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965); Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d
664 (6th Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
24 Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 203, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1967), where the court said:
... [the sixth amendment] demands are not satisfied when the accused is "repre-
sented" by a layman masquerading as a qualified attorney; it is unthinkable that
so precious a right, or so grave a responsibility, can be entrusted to one who has
not been admitted to the practice of the law, no matter how intelligent or well
educated he may be. This is particularly so where, as here, the accused is on
trial for an offense upon the conviction of which his very life could become
forfeit.
25 McKinzie v. Ellis, 287 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1961).
26Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1941). But see People v. Cox, 12 Ill. 2d
265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957), where a homicide defendant was held denied due process
because his attorney had not been licensed, but representation by one not licensed was
not ipso facto a denial of rights.
27 Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 344, 195 S.E. 316 (1938).
28 State v. Bridges, 109 La. 530, 33 So. 589 (1903).
[Vol. 6:152
tions of court appointed counsel. In Hackin v. Arizona29 counsel was
a graduate of an unaccredited law school and had been refused admis-
sion to the bar. The Court dismissed the case for want of a substantial
federal question, but Justice Douglas dissented, saying that ". . . there
is a dearth of lawyers who are willing, voluntarily, to take on unprofit-
able and unpoplar causes." 30 Douglas noted that some states, aware of
the acute shortage of lawyers to help indigents, have allowed qualified
law students to advise and even represent indigents in limited circum-
stances. Until the goals of free legal assistance to the indigent are
achieved, the poor will not be harmed by the well meaning, charitable
assistance of laymen; indeed, this may be the only hope for many indi-
gents to achieve equal justice.31
In Johnson v. Avery 32 the United States Supreme Court invalidated
a Tennessee statute which prohibited prison inmates from assisting other
poorly educated inmates in preparing petitions for post-conviction relief.
Such "jailhouse lawyers" provided the opportunity for certain prisoners
to be heard in court who otherwise would not have been heard. In
his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas emphasized that there are not
enough lawyers to handle all such claims and that the "traditional,
closed-shop attitude is utterly out of place in the modern world."
III. STUDENT PRACTICE
In June, 1971 the Council of the Virginia State Bar Association re-
jected a proposed new rule for the Rules for the Integration of the
State Bar providing for the appearance in court by certain third-year
law students.34 The proposed draft was based upon the model rule
promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1969. s5 The terms of
the proposed rule provided that third-year law students, certified by
29 389 U.S. 143 (1967).
30 id. at 146.
S Id. at 152.
32 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
33 Id. at 492.
34 The rule was submitted by a special Bar committee set up to study the proposal.
A similar committee had submitted a proposed rule in October, 1970 which met with
opposition at that time. The consideration of law students' appearance in court was
referred back to the committee for further study, the result of which was the adoption
of an amended rule. See 19 Va. Bar News, May 1971, at 9 and appendix.
35 Compare the proposed Virginia rule in the appendix to this Comment with the
A.BA. MODEL RULE. See CLINICAL EDUCATION A-ND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 228
(E. Kitch ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as CLINICAL EDUCATION].
1971] COMMEINTS
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the dean of their law school, could appear and participate in courts not
of record on behalf of indigent persons in both civil and criminal
matters when under the supervision of an attorney.36 The majority of
the states allow such practice either by rule of court, statute or case
decisionS7
Permitting certain law students to practice law on a limited basis
fulfills two important goals in our legal system. First, by providing
additional counselors, the pressing and expanding need for legal services
for the poor is met; and second, the quality of legal education is en-
hanced by clinical experience affording the law student sophisticated
knowledge of the legal process.
A. Legal Services for the Poor
With the expansion of the right to court-appointed counsel in indigent
cases marked by Gideon v. Wainwright,"' the demand for more lawyers
has become phenomenal. A perceptive statement by Dean Paulsen of
the University of Virginia Law School recognizes this fact:
The needs of the poor demand the services of many more lawyers-
perhaps thirty thousand. This fact has implications for legal educa-
tion, for the public isc and for law students. Law students and law




T See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 12-1-19 (1963); CoLo. R. Civ. P. 226; CONN. CI. Cr. R.
894; D.C. CT. GEN. SEss. R. 2 (Small Claims and Concilliation Branch); FLA. R. CrM. P.
1.860; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-401.1 (1967); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 711; IND. Sup. CT. R. 3-2A;
IOWA Sup. CT. R. 120; KAN. SUP. CT. R. 213; ME. Sup. Jut. CT. R. 90; MAss. Sup. Cr. R.
3:11; MicH. Sup. Cr. R. 921; MiNr. Sup. CT. R. FOR SEmOR LAw STUDENrs; MoNT. REV.
CODE § 93-6704 (1947); MONT. ORDER OF THE SUP. CT. (1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 7-101.01
(1967); NJ. Sup. CT. R. 1:21-3; N.Y. Jun. LAW §§ 478, 484 (McKinney Supp.
1967); OHio Sup. CT. R. XVII A; PA. R. 12-3/4; S.C. CODE § 56-102 (1962); TENN. Sup.
CT. R. 37 § 21; Wyo. Sup. CT. R. FOR BAR Assoc. 18. See also Application of Legal Aid
Society of Albany, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 687, 277 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1967) (permitting
third year law students to engage in limited practice under supervision); Application of
Cornell Legal Aid Clinic, 26 App. Div. 790, 273 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1966). Cf. In re Opinion
of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935).
38 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Gideon's little regiment had no difficulty in running up its colors, but it is
quite apparent that an army-a very large one-must be raised if the victory is to
be a lasting one.
Monaghan, Gideon's Army: Student Soldiers, 45 B.U.L. REv. 445, 446 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as 45 B.U.L. REv.]
39 Paulsen, The Need for Legal Aid, 19 VA. L. WEEKLY DIcTA COMP. 30, 36 (1968).
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In his dissent to Hackin v. Arizona,10 Justice Douglas observed that:
The need of America's poor for legal assistance vastly outstrips the
legal resources which will be available in the foreseeable future. Law
students represent a large, interested and capable source of assistance.
They can provide legal assistance to the poor and improve the quality
of their legal education at the same time .... 41
At present the burden of handling indigent cases falls upon the Bar
in Virginia and, in a few instances, upon legal aid societies set up within
the Bar.4 Unquestionably, the addition of selected law students to the
available force of lawyers to handle indigent cases would provide a
tremendous relief to the work load of those attorneys handling such
cases.
The argument has been made that representation of indigents by law
students in criminal matters would not meet the constitutional limita-
tions of the sixth amendment right to counsel. In response, advocates
of student practice contend that although lacking in experience and
maturity, law students will compensate with a high degree of prepara-
tion and enthusiasm. 4a In effect, law students could provide representa-
tion equivalent to that given by young members of the Bar, and possi-
bly better than that given by older members of the Bar whose work
schedule prohibits a time-consuming, in depth investigation into the
case 44 Student practice would not constitute a "farce" or a "mockery
of justice" so as to violate constitutional limitations on the effectiveness
of counsel," where the indigent has consented to such representation
in writing and where he has a right to an appeal de novo to a court of
40 389 U.S. 143 (1967).
41 Id. at 147.
42 However, there has been an appellate litigation seminar at the University of
Virginia since 1965 which handles three indigent cases per year before the fourth circuit.
See Sokol, In Forma Pauperis Appeals: The University of Virginia Experiment with a
Neglected Asset, 18 J. LEaAL ED. 96 (1965).
43 See, e.g., Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 147 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
It is agreed that a law student would provide service that is at least equal with
that which the average practitioner would provide in the average case.
Fleisher, The Practice of Law by Law Students: An Analysis, appearing in CLINCAL
EDUCAnoN, supra note 35, at 130 [hereinafter cited as CLIMCAL EDUCATIoN NOTE].
44 45 B.U.L. REv., supra note 38, at 460.
45 See note 23, supra.
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record.16 In any event, "it is undoubtedly better for indigents to get
some legal assistance rather than none." 47
B. Clinical Legal Education
In thirteenth century England legal education was conducted as an
apprenticeship, and those who were responsible for giving legal educa-
tion were charged with the duty of selecting those students who should
be privileged to practice in the courts.48 In the early history of Ameri-
can legal education, a student "read law" in the office of a practicing
attorney as an apprentice until he was competent to practice on his
own. Education was by way of practical experience. Indeed, the first
American law schools were said to be "merely the apprentice system
on a group basis." 49
Law schools today generally teach law by the case system, and the
critics of this system are legion. In 1947 Jerome Frank, in suggesting
clinical teaching methods, commented that:
American legal education went badly wrong some seventy years ago
when it was seduced by a brilliant neurotic. I refer to the well-known
founder of the so-called case system, Christopher Columbus Langdell.
The neurotic escapist character of Langdell stamped itself on the
educational programs of our leading law schools .... The Langdell
spirit choked legal education. 0
Today legal education reform is still very much a topical issue domi-
nated by arguments for clinical reform, curriculum change and aboli-
tion of the third year of law school. 1
The proponents of clinical legal education are numerous and quite
prominent. At the August 10, 1969 Annual Convention of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, Chief Justice Burger compared law graduates
46 Carefully constructed programs for student representation of indigents seem to
me to pose no threat to the policies embodied in the sixth amendment. Quite to
the contrary, they give real meaning to the amendment's aims.
45 B.U.L. REv., supra note 38, at 461.
47 CLINICAL EDUCATION NoTE, supra note 43, at 135.
48 2 W. HoLms-WoamH, supra note 1, at 315.
49 Frank, A Plea for Laewyer-Scbools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947) [hereinafter cited as 56
YALE LJ.].
50 Id. at 1303-04.
51 See Allen, Legal Education Reform: The Third Year Problem, 16 S.LJ. 4 (1971).
[Vol. 6:152J-6.0
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today with doctors who never see live patients.5 2 In previously making
the analogy between law schools and medical schools, Jerome Frank
had asked:
What would we say of a medical school where students were taught
surgery solely from the printed page? No one, if he could do other-
wise, would teach the art of playing golf by having the teacher talk
about golf to the prospective player and having the latter read a book
relating to the subject. The same holds true for toe-dancing, swim-
ming, automobile-driving, haircutting, or cooking wild ducks.n3
Justice Douglas has frequently noted the improvement that would occur
in the quality of legal education if law students were allowed to repre-
sent indigents.5 4
C. Objections to Student Practice
Besides objections to student practice on the basis of the constitu-
tional limitations on the right to counsel5 and on the basis of lack of
maturity and experience, " many lawyers feel that they will lose clients
to students offering gratuitous services. This argument is untenable
because student practice would only involve indigents.5 7 Another ob-
stacle is the interruption in client service upon graduation or during
examinations. This problem may be overcome by well-planned admin-
istration."" Some say that clients represented by law students will feel
like "guinea pigs," but here again some legal assistance is better than
none. 9
It is urged that student practice is not the unauthorized practice of
law when the primary purpose is the education of law students and the
benefit to the public is great 0 In addition, the safeguards imposed by
521d.
5356 YALE L.J., supra note 49, at 1311. See also Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and
Respect for Law, 1970 DuKE LJ. 425.
54 See note 41 and text supra.
55 See note 46 supra.
56 Experience cannot be equated with competence, nor can inexperience be equated
with incompetence. See 45 B.U.L. REv., supra note 38, at 461.
57 Suggested in a Memorandum in Support of the Proposed Rule Change to Admit
Law Students to Limited Practice in the Courts of Louisiana, filed by Art Smith and
others.
58 See 45 B.U.L. REv., supra note 38, at 132.
59 Id. at 132, 135.
60 See note 57 supra.
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the model rule and the proposed Virginia rule satisfy the restrictions on
the unauthorized practice of law. Students must meet eligibility re-
quirements, must be certified by their dean, and must always function
under the supervision and personal responsibility of an attorney. 1
The most serious objections concern the ethical responsibility of
those not admitted to the Bar. Certainly, students not admitted to the
Bar cannot be fully bound by the canons of ethics, but the supervising
attorney will be bound. It would be feasible to require an oath of each
practicing student that he would observe certain ethical standards, and
for failure to do so or for malfeasant conduct, his admission to the Bar
would be placed in jeopardy."z
IV. CONCLUSION
It is the duty of every lawyer to assist in making legal counsel avail-
able pursuant to the Code of Ethics.68 The Ethical Considerations urge
that:
The rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable
fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer, but the efforts of the
individual lawyer are often not enough to meet the demand. Thus, it
has been necessary for the profession to institute additional programs
to provide legal services. Accordingly, legal aid offices, lawyer refer-
ral services, and other related programs have been developed, and
others will be developed, by the profession. Every lawyer should
support all proper efforts to meet this demand for legal services. 4
Since there is a demonstrative need for legal services for indigents,
and since third year law students can meet this need and benefit their
education in the process, the Bar has an ethical duty to support the




62 Cf. Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966, 992
(1967):
The old justification for the rules of legal ethics will no longer suffice ...
[T]he Court is asking that these rules focus on the actual harm to the client
or to the public. The reform in legal ethics, which had only been a matter of
sound policy and good sense now may be a matter of constitutional imperative.
63 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 2.






RULES FOR INTEGRATION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR
Appearances in Courts by Certain Third Year Law Students.
I. Purpose
The bench and the bar are primarily responsible for providing compe-
tent legal services for all persons, including those unable to pay for
these services. As one means of providing assistance to lawyers who
represent clients unable to pay for such services and as a means to
encourage law schools to provide clinical instruction in trial work of
varying kinds on a voluntary basis, the following rule is adopted.
II. Activities
A. On Behalf of Any Indigent Person. An eligible law student may
appear and participate in the proceedings in any court not of record
or before any administrative tribunal in this State on behalf of
any indigent person if the person on whose behalf he is appearing
has indicated in writing his consent to that appearance and the
supervising lawyer has also indicated in writing approval of that
appearance, in the following matters:
1. Any civil matter provided the supervising lawyer is personally
present in court throughout the proceedings; and,
2. Any criminal matter in which the defendant is charged with
an offense the penalty for which does not involve confinement
in a penal institution provided the supervising lawyer is per-
sonally present in court throughout the proceedings.
B. On Behalf of the State. An eligible law student may also appear
and participate in the proceedings in any criminal matter on behalf
of the State with the written approval of the Attorney for the
Commonwealth or his authorized representative, of the supervising
lawyer and of the court. In each case, the Attorney for the Com-
monwealth or the supervising lawyer shall be present in court
throughout the proceedings.
C. As an Assistant to a Supervising Lawyer Engaged in Private Prac-
tce. An eligible law student may appear and participate in the
proceedings in any court or before any administrative tribunal in
1971]
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this State on behalf of a client represented by the supervising law-
yer as an assistant to the supervising lawyer engaged in private
practice provided the supervising lawyer is personally present
throughout the proceedings and in full charge of the manner in
which they are conducted.
III. Requirements and Limitations
A. Requirements
In order to make an appearance pursuant to this rule, the law stu-
dent must:
1. Be a student in good standing of a law school in this State ap-
proved by the American Bar Association;
2. Have completed legal studies amounting to no less than two of
the customary three school years of such studies;
3. Be certified by the dean, or a faculty member designated by
the dean, of his law school as being of good character and
competent legal ability, and as being adequately trained to per-
form as a legal intern; and,
4. Certify in writing that he has read, is familiar with and agrees
to be bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility of the
Virginia State Bar.
B. Limitations
No appearance may be made pursuant to this rule until the eligible
law student shall have:
1. Filed the written consent and approval, as applicable, required
under Paragraph II (A and B) of this rule in the record in the
case;
2. Filed his statement in the record that he has not accepted and
will not accept any compensation or remuneration of any kind
for his services from the person on whose behalf he rendered
services, but this shall not prevent a lawyer, legal aid bureau,
law school, public defender agency, or the State from paying
compensation to the eligible law student, nor shall it prevent
any agency or private practitioner from making such charges
for services as may otherwise be proper; and,
3. Been introduced to the court in which he is appearing by the
supervising lawyer admitted to practice in that court and where
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required taken an oath similar to that taken by the supervising
lawyer.
IV. Certification and Termination
A. Certification
The certification of a student by the law school dean, or his desig-
nee:
1. Shall be filed with the clerk of this court and, unless it is sooner
withdrawn, it shall remain in effect until the expiration of fif-
teen (15) months after it is filed, or until the announcement of
the results of the first bar examination following the student's
graduation, whichever is earlier; and,
2. Shall contain a certificate of the mailing of a copy thereof to
the supervising lawyer whose full name and office address shall
be shown therein.
B. Termination
The certification may be terminated at any time without notice
or hearing and without any showing of cause by:
1. The dean, or his designee, or by any judge of a court of record
within whose jurisdiction the student has taken any action
under this rule, by mailing a notice to that effect to the clerk
of this court with a copy of said termination being mailed to
the supervising lawyer and the student; or,
2. By this Court. Notice of the termination shall be filed with the
clerk of this court who shall immediately forward a copy of
such notice to the supervising lawyer and the student.
V. Other Activities on Behalf of Indigent Persons
A. An eligible law student may engage in other activities on behalf
of indigent persons relating to the matters set forth under para-
graph II, A, 1. and 2., under the general supervision of the super-
vising lawyer, but outside the personal presence of that lawyer,
including the preparation of pleadings, briefs, abstracti and other
documents filed in any matter in which the student is eligible to
appear and when any such matter is appealed to a court of record,
the preparation of briefs, abstracts and other documents to be filed
in such court of record; but such pleadings, briefs, abstracts or
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other documents must contain the name and address of the eligible
law student who participated in the drafting thereof and must be
signed by the supervising lawyer. If the eligible law student par-
ticipated in drafting only a portion of the document, that fact
may be mentioned.
B. In addition to the foregoing, an eligible law student may participate
in oral argument in courts of record on matters referred to in
V. A. above, but only in the presence of the supervising lawyer.
VI. Supersision
The member of the bar under whose supervision an eligible law stu-
dent does any of the things permitted by this rule shall:
A. Be a member of the Virginia State Bar who has had at least three
years experience in the practice of law as a duly qualified and li-
censed attorney whether in Virginia or elsewhere, and whose serv-
ice as a supervising lawyer for this program is approved by the
dean, or his designee, of the law school in which the student is
enrolled;
B. Assume personal professional responsibility for the student's guid-
ance in any work undertaken and for supervising the quality of the
student's work;
C. Assist the student in his preparation to the extent the supervising
lawyer considers it necessary;
D. Be limited, if he be in private practice, to the supervision of only
one eligible law student at any given time;
E. Report to the dean, or his designee, at the conclusion of his super-
visory period as to any work undertaken by the student and as
to the quality of the student's work; and,
F. Make such report as may be requested by the Council of the Vir-
ginia State Bar as to enable it to evaluate from time to time the
desirability of changes or modifications to this rule.
VII. Miscellaneous
Nothing contained in this rule shall affect the right of any person
who is not admitted to practice law to do anything he might lawfully
do prior to the adoption of this rule.
